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PREVENTING DEADLY
INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Assembling Evidence on the Effectiveness of
Preventive Actions, their Benefits, and their Costs

A Guide for Preparation of Evidence

Version 1.0

August 1996

Note: This guide offers suggestions for the preparation of evidence about the effectiveness, costs and benefits of actions that can help to prevent deadly intergroup conflict. The Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) seeks to assemble such evidence and promote its collection by others. The present document is the initial version of a guide that IRSS hopes to revise repeatedly. We welcome comments or additional information that will contribute to improvements in subsequent versions. Comments or information can be directed to Gordon Thompson at IRSS.

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ASSEMBLING EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS, THEIR BENEFITS AND THEIR COSTS

A Guide for Preparation of Evidence Version 1.0

Summary

In this document, the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) provides guidance for the preparation of evidence about actions that can help to prevent deadly conflict between groups of people. The focus is on conflicts that may escalate to major civil disturbances, civil wars, or wars between nations. Experience suggests that violence can be prevented in many situations, often at relatively modest cost.

This guide assumes that evidence will be obtained through a case study approach. Each case study will review experience with one or more preventive actions in a selected situation. The objective is to assemble evidence on the effectiveness of the preventive actions, their benefits, and their costs. This evidence should be prepared in a manner that helps readers to draw their own conclusions. Also, case studies will be more useful if they are prepared according to a standardized format, thus facilitating the review and comparison of multiple cases. This guide proposes such a format. Two case studies are presented here, using the proposed format.

From interviews and workshops, IRSS has concluded that the assembling of evidence about preventive actions can provide information that is useful for many purposes. IRSS seeks to collect such evidence. A systematic body of evidence, especially one prepared using a standardized format, will be useful to policy analysts, government decision makers, diplomats, legislators, educators, researchers, the media, and others.

Preventive actions are of many types, and can be conducted by a variety of government, intergovernment or nongovernment organizations, acting alone or in combination. Actions may be taken far in advance or immediately before a potential outbreak of violence. Multiple preventive actions, undertaken simultaneously or at different times, may contribute to the prevention of violence in a given situation. A preventive action may also serve other purposes, such as humanitarian relief.

Assessing the effectiveness and benefits of preventive actions is intrinsically difficult (the costs of preventive actions are easier to assess). However, evidence can be assembled in such a manner that it will support a reasoned judgement about effectiveness and benefits. This guide offers suggestions for assembling the needed evidence.

About the Institute for Resource and Security Studies

The Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) was founded in 1984 to conduct research and public education on international security and the sustainable use of natural resources. IRSS's simultaneous pursuit of these two broad areas reflects a conviction that resource and security issues are intimately related and often require a common approach.

IRSS works on the prevention of deadly conflict as part of its activities in the area of international security. In addition to conducting research and education on preventive actions, IRSS also pursues such actions directly, through its Program on Promoting Understanding and Cooperation. Those actions include the convening of dialogue and training workshops, and the development of integrated action programs.

Acknowledgements

This guide was written by Gordon Thompson, executive director of IRSS. Paula Gutlove, director of IRSS's Program on Promoting Understanding and Cooperation, contributed to the documentation of the case studies that are discussed in Appendices A and B. These case studies were built around presentations by Louise Diamond and John McDonald of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, and by Mark Nichols of the US Agency for International Development, to whom IRSS extends its thanks. IRSS also thanks the participants in seminars at which these presentations were made (see Appendices A and B for a listing of participants).

In the early stages of this project, IRSS received considerable guidance from the participants in a workshop that was held in March 1995. IRSS is grateful to these participants, who are listed in the report on the workshop (Thompson, 1995).

This project was partly supported by a grant from the HKH Foundation, to which IRSS extends thanks. The Winston Foundation for World Peace has also supported this project financially, through the use of its facilities, and through logistical support. IRSS thanks the Winston Foundation and, in particular, its staff members Jean Donnelly Linde, Tara Magner, and John Tirman.

Some Statements on Preventing Deadly Conflict

"Preventive defense may be thought of as analogous to preventive medicine. Preventive medicine creates the conditions which support health, making disease less likely and surgery unnecessary. Preventive defense creates the conditions which support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary."

(William J. Perry, US Secretary of Defense, speech at Harvard University, 13 May 1996)

"The concept of conflict prevention is the essence of diplomacy, but it goes much wider than that. The tasks it generates are so great that they are not just for diplomats. A role needs to be developed where diplomats, development workers, NGOs, academics and international organisations can work together to tackle different aspects of these complex problems."

(Baroness Chalker, UK Minister for Overseas Development, speech at a seminar in London, February 1996)

"Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy -- through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military-to-military contacts and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere -- in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost."

(The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1995)

"It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico-military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out."

(Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, 3 January 1995)

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1. Introduction

Conflict between individuals and groups has always been part of the human condition. On countless occasions, intergroup conflict has become deadly. In the twentieth century, the potential scale of deadly intergroup conflict has reached an unprecedented level, first through the mechanized warfare seen in the two world wars, then through the introduction of nuclear weapons. The 1990s have brought a wide spectrum of deadly conflicts, including a full-scale mechanized war (the 1991 Gulf War) and intrastate violence in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.

While history provides an ample record of deadly conflict, there is also a long record of actions that have prevented, or helped to prevent, deadly intergroup conflict from breaking out or re-occurring. These actions have been taken by a variety of actors, including individuals, nongovernment organizations, governments, and intergovernment organizations. Often, the actions were successful because a number of actions were taken in combination, or because other circumstances created an enabling context. Some actions have been successful for limited periods, as in temporary cease-fire agreements, while other actions have prevented violence over periods of many years.

In this document, the term "preventive action" refers to any human action that has helped to prevent deadly intergroup conflict in the past, or that has the potential to help prevent deadly conflict in the future. The US government displays a growing interest in such actions. Other governments, intergovernment organizations, nongovernment groups and many individuals share this interest. We believe that the high level of interest reflects a growing support for four propositions. First, the prevention of deadly intergroup conflict is often a feasible goal. Second, deadly conflicts can often be anticipated. Third, seeking to prevent an anticipated deadly conflict is an appropriate goal for governments and other entities. Fourth, preventive action is often less costly, in monetary and other terms, than responding to a deadly conflict after it has erupted.

Each of these propositions can be debated, and has been. Policy analysts have expressed doubt about the feasibility of preventive action, the practicality of anticipating violent conflict, the appropriateness of engaging in preventive action, and the cost-effectiveness of preventive action. In response to this debate, the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS) has begun a project to assemble evidence on the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive actions. The present document is a guide for the preparation of such evidence. IRSS expects that an accumulating body of evidence will contribute to the policy debate about preventive action, and will also be useful in the planning and implementation of preventive actions.

IRSS uses the word "evidence" deliberately. This word has been defined by Webster's Dictionary as "anything that provides material or information on which a conclusion or proof may be based". Thus, our objective is not to prove any specific claim about either preventive actions in general or any particular

preventive action. Instead, we seek to assemble evidence that will help others to draw their own conclusions. Moreover, we encourage other organizations to collect similar evidence.

As defined here, the preventive action field is very broad, since it encompasses every action that contributes significantly to peace and security, both internationally and at the intrastate level. Thus, a body of evidence about the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive actions will, ultimately, be very large. Modern information technology, including computerized data bases, CD-ROMs and the Internet, allows such a large body of information to be readily stored, processed, and exchanged. However, a modest level of standardization would greatly improve the usefulness of the evidence. Agreement on a basic conceptual framework for preventive action, and on an accompanying lexicon, would facilitate the comparison of evidence from different situations and different observers. In this guide, IRSS has taken some initial steps toward the development of a standardized conceptual framework and lexicon. We plan to continue that development, but recognize the importance of doing so in collaboration with others in the field. IRSS would welcome the opportunity for such collaboration.

This guide assumes that evidence will be obtained through a case study approach. Each case study will review experience with one or more preventive actions in a selected situation. The focus will be on intergroup conflicts that may escalate to major civil disturbances, civil wars, or wars between states. A case study could proceed as an entirely written exercise, or it could be developed partly through group discussion. In either case, a standardized format will be useful. This guide proposes such a format. Also included in this guide, as Appendices A and B, are dossiers on two case studies. These case studies were developed through oral presentations and subsequent discussion at two seminars, and they are documented using IRSS's proposed format.

Before embarking on this project, IRSS sought advice from a group of distinguished experts who were invited to a workshop in March 1995 (Thompson, 1995). From this workshop, and from interviews conducted in 1994 and 1995, IRSS reached two major conclusions that are relevant to the project. First, evidence on the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive action can and should be assembled. Second, a case study approach using a standardized format is a feasible and useful way of preparing evidence.

In the remainder of this guide, we begin (section 2) with a discussion about preventive action since the end of World War II. This discussion includes some observations that are intended to stimulate debate. Then (section 3), we present four broad categories of preventive action. A discussion of the nature of deadly conflict and its costs (section 4) leads into our suggestions for assessing the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive actions (section 5). Finally (section 6), we suggest a process for assembling evidence through case studies, and propose a standardized format for such studies. A selected bibliography is also provided (section 7).

2. A Post-World War II Perspective on Preventive Action

This document is not a treatise on the theory and application of preventive action, but a guide for the preparation of evidence. Nevertheless, we offer some brief observations on preventive action since the end of World War II, because we believe that a historical perspective is essential. During this half-century period, preventive actions of unprecedented scale and complexity were undertaken. Actions taken during the coming decades will build upon those efforts. Thus, anyone involved in the preventive action field should have some familiarity with the types of preventive action taken since World War II, and their successes and failures.

There is a vast literature from this period on subjects relevant to deadly conflict and its prevention. Some of the future scholarly inquiry into the period could usefully be directed to elucidating lessons that are applicable to preventive action over coming decades. Here, to stimulate debate, we simply highlight a few of the large-scale preventive actions that were taken soon after World War II, and offer some broad observations on the influence that these and other actions have exerted over the past half century.

Immediately after World War II, governments and citizens were acutely aware of the costs of war. As a result, there was strong support for the concept of preventive action, although not under that name. Governmental support for preventive action found expression through measures such as the founding of international institutions, treaty commitments, and substantial expenditures. Subsequently, those measures have had a profound influence on international security.

The most ambitious preventive action in the years immediately after World War II was the establishment of the United Nations, whose Charter came into force in October 1945. It is currently fashionable in some circles to disparage the UN. In 1945, however, millions of people looked to the UN with hope that it would bring lasting world peace. The importance then attached to the UN as a war-preventing body is evident in its Charter. Article 1 of the Charter sets forth the purposes of the United Nations, in four paragraphs. The first paragraph states the purpose:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

Another large-scale preventive action was the North Atlantic Treaty, which came into force in 1949. Many people think of this treaty simply as a pledge of collective defense against a potential attack, presumably by the Soviet Union. The treaty did indeed establish the basis for the NATO defensive alliance. For

example, in Article 5 the parties agreed that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". In addition, however, the parties pledged to pursue peaceful relations with each other and with the world at large. Thus, Article 1 states:

"The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

It is also noteworthy that, in Article 2, the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty promise that they "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them".

In the 1940s, there was broad agreement that economic development, finance, monetary policy and international trade are key factors in international security. Policymakers agreed that inadequate management of these factors had contributed to the onset of World War II. An important expression of this consensus was the convening of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. This conference led to the founding of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which commenced operations in 1946. At first, the World Bank helped to finance the reconstruction of the war-ravaged economies of western Europe, but later shifted its lending focus, as foreseen during the Bretton Woods conference, to developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Marshall Plan was a remarkable expression of US support for the concept of preventive action. First signalled by General Marshall in a speech at Harvard University in June 1947, the Marshall Plan transferred 13 billion dollars from the United States to Western Europe over the four-year period 1948 through 1951. Of this amount, 91 percent was grant aid and 9 percent was loans (Grosser, 1982). During these four years, the United States was transferring about 1 percent of its GNP to western Europe. This expensive exercise was widely supported in the United States, and was clearly seen as a preventive action. In illustration, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a former isolationist, endorsed the Marshall Plan in a March 1948 Senate speech which included the words (Grosser, 1982):

"This legislation, Mr. President, seeks peace and stability for free men in a free world. It seeks them by economic rather than military means. It proposes to help our friends to help themselves in the pursuit of sound and successful liberty.....It strives to help stop World War III before it starts.....It sustains western civilization. It means to take western Europe completely off the dole at the end of the adventure. It recognizes the grim truth - whether we like it or not - that American self-interest, national economy, and national security are inseparably linked with these objectives."

Relatively few conditions were attached to Marshall Plan aid. One condition was that the recipient nations must work together to request the aid and to pursue economic cooperation. This requirement led to the establishment in 1948 of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which survived the Marshall Plan, expanded in membership, and became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), still an important international body.

Since the 1940s, there has been a host of actions, large and small, which meet our definition of a preventive action. In some cases, prevention of deadly conflict was a primary purpose of the action, while in other cases such prevention was a secondary purpose. Consider a few examples of the types of preventive action that have been taken during this half-century period.

First, arms control treaties, regional security organizations and other mechanisms have moderated military competition and helped to reduce the incidence of armed conflict between states. Second, economic cooperation and development have been promoted through international, regional and bilateral arrangements, often with the enhancement of international security as a specific purpose. Third, numerous efforts have been made to mediate or resolve conflicts between and within states, with the objective of limiting or avoiding deadly conflict. Fourth, programs to promote democracy have been pursued, partly because of a conviction that democratic states tend not to fight each other. Fifth, human rights have been promoted, partly with the objective of reducing intrastate conflict and violence. Sixth, citizens of conflicting states or groups have made contact with each other, a process which has often helped to establish the political basis for interstate or intergroup cooperation.

A wide variety of actors have engaged in preventive actions. There are three broad categories of such actors: intergovernment organizations; government agencies; and nongovernment organizations. Within these three categories one finds entities of many different types and sizes. Each entity has roles for which it is well suited, while it may have little to contribute in other roles.

As one looks back over the past half-century, it is possible to make some broad observations about preventive action. Here, we offer a few observations, which do not purport to be definitive conclusions but are intended to stimulate discussion. Our observations are:

*** PREVENTIVE ACTIONS CAN WORK**

Everyone knows that the past fifty years have seen many wars and episodes of intrastate violence. Yet, for millions of people this has been a period of peace. The industrialized countries have refrained from fighting each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945. Many societies have been relatively free of intrastate violence. This outcome is not an accident, but is to a substantial degree a product of the resources and effort that have been devoted to preventive action.

* PREVENTIVE ACTIONS TYPICALLY WORK IN COMBINATION

It is common for a variety of prevent actions to be influential in a given situation. Typically, these actions are mutually supportive, and their combined effect is greater than the effect that each preventive action would have in isolation. Two corollaries flow from this observation. First, because each preventive action has its own set of actors, a variety of actors will be influential in any given situation. Second, it will often be impossible to attribute the prevention of deadly conflict to a single preventive action or set of actors.

* PATIENCE IS OFTEN NECESSARY

Rarely does a preventive action yield an effect over a period of weeks or months. More often, years or even decades must pass before the action yields its effect. Two corollaries arise. First, durable institutions are usually needed to implement preventive actions. Second, governments and taxpayers should take a long-term view of the benefits of preventive actions.

* PREVENTIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS CHEAP AND EASY

Sometimes, preventive actions can be remarkably cheap and simple. For example, there have been occasions when a brief diplomatic intervention has headed off a deadly conflict. In other cases, however, substantial expenditures are involved. The Marshall Plan is an example. Sometimes, risk is involved. For example, security guarantees can be effective preventive actions, but only if the guaranteeing power is willing to back up its pledge by placing its soldiers, and perhaps its civilians, at risk.

* PREVENTIVE ACTIONS SHOULD OFTEN BE INTEGRATED WITH OTHER PROGRAMS

In many cases, preventive actions promote goals that are desirable in their own right, quite aside from their relevance to violence. Economic development, democracy and human rights are examples of such goals. Thus, preventive actions will often be most efficient if integrated with programs that pursue other goals. The implementing agencies and program sponsors should accommodate and seek such integration.

* PREVENTIVE ACTIONS CAN BE COST-EFFECTIVE

Although not always cheap, preventive actions can yield benefits that far outweigh their costs. The costs of preventive actions should be compared with the hundreds of billions of dollars that are spent each year on armed forces, and with the potentially much greater costs, both human and material, of war. More research is needed to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of preventive actions. To support this research, more evidence should be assembled.

3. Categories of Preventive Action

At present, there is no agreement on a conceptual framework, and accompanying lexicon, for preventive action. Agreement on these matters is desirable, and would facilitate policy discussions about preventive action. IRSS seeks to promote such agreement (Gutlove and Thompson, 1995). In the

meantime, we favor a conceptual framework that has been articulated by Gareth Evans, formerly Australia's foreign minister (Evans, 1993). The Evans framework divides the universe of preventive action into four broad categories: (i) peace building; (ii) peace maintenance; (iii) peace restoration; and (iv) peace enforcement. A description of each category follows:

* PEACE BUILDING

This category encompasses actions that are taken before a conflict reaches a crisis that could lead to violence. A pre-crisis situation of this kind could exist in the absence of any recent violence, or when conditions have settled down after an episode of violence. In the latter case, the objective of a peace building action is to prevent violence from recurring. Evans has described two types of peace building action:

- + "International regimes" are laws, norms, agreements and arrangements - global, regional or bilateral in scope - that are designed to minimize threats to security, promote confidence and trust, and create frameworks for dialogue and cooperation.
- + "In-country peace building" refers to national and international efforts aimed at economic development, institution building and, more generally, the creation or restoration within countries of the conditions necessary to make them stable and viable states.

* PEACE MAINTENANCE

This category encompasses actions that are designed to resolve or contain conflicts that are near a crisis stage, to prevent them from escalating into violence. Evans has described two types of peace maintenance action:

- + "Preventive diplomacy" refers to the range of methods described in Article 33 of the UN Charter - namely negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means - when applied before a conflict has crossed the threshold into violence.
- + "Preventive deployment" is defined as the deployment of military or police, and possible civilian, personnel with the intention of preventing a conflict from escalating into violence.

* PEACE RESTORATION

This category encompasses actions that are intended to resolve a conflict after it has crossed the threshold of violence. Actions in this category are premised on the cooperation or agreement of the governments or parties concerned. Evans describes two types of peace restoration action:

- + "Peace making" is best understood as a close relative of preventive diplomacy, involving the same range of methods described in Article 33 of the UN Charter, but applied after a conflict has become violent.

- + "Peace keeping" involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian, personnel to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in violent conflict.

* PEACE ENFORCEMENT

This category encompasses responses to conflicts where the agreement of all relevant governments or parties is lacking. Actions in this category will be taken when a conflict is at or beyond a crisis stage, either before or after violence has broken out. Evans describes two types of peace enforcement action:

- + "Sanctions" are measures, not involving the use or threat of military force, that are designed to compel or stop a course of action by a state or party. Typically, these measures involve the denial of access to goods, services or other externally provided requirements.

- + "Peace enforcement" is the threat or use of military force, in pursuit of peaceful objectives, in response to a violent conflict or other major security crisis. The 1991 Gulf War was an action of this type.

Within these four broad categories, there are many possible preventive actions. A particular preventive action will be applicable to some types of conflict, or to some stages in the development of a conflict, but will not be applicable in other situations. Similarly, a particular preventive action will be appropriate for use by some actors but not by others. For any given conflict, an optimal strategy for preventing violence is likely to involve the application of multiple preventive actions by multiple actors, with the emphasis shifting from one group of preventive actions to another as the conflict passes through its life cycle.

A valuable catalogue of preventive actions has been prepared by the consulting firm Creative Associates International, as part of the US government's Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (Creative Associates, 1996). For each preventive action that is described, this catalogue introduces the action, describes its applicability to different types and stages of conflict, discusses questions of implementation, and describes some practical experience with the action. The catalogue is part of a "guide for practitioners" which also provides other useful information and conceptual analysis.

4. Deadly Conflict and its Costs

Before we embark on the problem of assessing the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive actions, it is useful to think about the nature of deadly conflict and the costs of such conflict. A brief examination of these issues is provided here.

One subject to consider is the degree of danger or violence associated with a conflict. Michael Lund has identified five stages of conflict (Lund, 1996):

* DURABLE PEACE involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the virtual absence of self-defense measures among parties, although it may include their military alliance against a common threat.

* STABLE PEACE is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g., trade) within an overall context of basic order or national stability.

* UNSTABLE PEACE is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high but violence is either absent or only sporadic.

* CRISIS is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight and may engage in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes but have not exerted any significant amount of force.

* WAR is sustained fighting between organized armed forces.

Lund further shows how conflicts follow a life cycle, rising and falling from one of these stages to another. He analyzes the applicability of particular types of preventive action to particular parts of this life cycle.

A student or practitioner of preventive action must think about the sources of conflict. A valuable analysis of these sources is provided by Creative Associates International (Creative Associates, 1996). This analysis identifies three categories of sources: (i) systemic (background) preconditions; (ii) enabling (proximate) factors; and (iii) triggering (immediate) events.

In examining the costs of deadly conflict, one finds, somewhat surprisingly, a limited body of systematic analysis. There is a large body of relevant literature, but the information contained in this literature has rarely been analyzed in such a manner that the costs of different conflicts can be compared and the total costs of a given conflict can be assessed. The major piece of analysis of this kind is a study by Saferworld, a nongovernment organization based in the UK (Cranna et al, 1994).

The Saferworld study examined seven recent wars. For each war, the study assessed a range of costs for the parties directly involved and for those indirectly involved (e.g., as an ally of a directly involved party). Categories of costs for the directly involved parties included: (i) development (health was included in this category); (ii) civil and political rights (casualties were included in this category); (iii) the economy; (iv) infrastructure; and (v) the environment. Within these categories, costs were expressed using quantitative or qualitative indicators, as appropriate. Where a directly or indirectly involved party received some benefit from the war, this was assessed. For each war, a counter-factual analysis was conducted, seeking to estimate the benefits and costs to the various parties if the war had not occurred.

Throughout history, wars have engendered famines, epidemics and displacement of populations. Conversely, human suffering has often

contributed to the onset of war. However, deadly conflicts in the contemporary world seem to have a particularly strong association with famine, disease and refugees. Whether or not the incidence of war-related human suffering is actually greater than in the deadly conflicts of previous centuries, there is a new factor in contemporary conflicts, namely the provision of humanitarian assistance by external entities. In most deadly conflicts of the current period, international agencies and nongovernment organizations are soon engaged in providing relief and assistance to afflicted populations. The presence of these entities typically has a strong influence on the development of the conflict. Another feature of the current period is the international community's growing support for human rights, which is linked to a growing willingness to intervene in local conflicts.

5. Effectiveness, Benefits and Costs of Preventive Actions

Assessing the effectiveness or the benefits of a preventive action is an intrinsically difficult exercise. Rarely will this exercise yield a clear, objectively defensible answer. Instead, the best that can usually be expected is to assemble a body of evidence that will support a reasoned judgement. By comparison, assessing the costs of a preventive action will usually be a conceptually straightforward task, although not a trivial one.

Generally, a preventive action will be assessed on the basis of evidence from a situation where a feared deadly conflict did not occur. Such a situation is presumed here. In later versions of this guide, IRSS may discuss the assessment of preventive actions using evidence from situations where deadly conflict did occur.

Three sets of assessment tasks arise:

*** ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS**

The first measure of the effectiveness of a preventive action is its influence on the outcome of a conflict. In one approach to examining this measure, the assessor will first hypothesize one or more violent outcomes of the conflict. Then, the assessor will ask: How likely is it that the conflict would have proceeded to the hypothesized violent outcomes : (i) if the preventive action were not taken?; or (ii) when the preventive action was taken? The difference in the two answers will indicate the influence of the preventive action. There will, of course, be complicating factors, which will typically include the presence of preventive actions other than the one being assessed.

An alternative approach would be to assess the influence of the preventive action on parameters that are thought to be associated with the onset of violence. The same kind of evidence will be collected as in the previous approach, but the assessor will not articulate hypothetical outcomes or estimate the likelihood of those outcomes.

A second measure of the effectiveness of a preventive action is its relative efficiency, in comparison to other preventive actions. If the benefits and costs of

a preventive action could be expressed quantitatively, the action's efficiency would simply be the ratio of benefits to costs. In practice, an action's benefits and costs can rarely be expressed quantitatively, so efficiency will usually be a diffuse indicator. However, the basic idea is clear. One preventive action will be preferred over another if it yields better results for less effort.

* ASSESSING BENEFITS

A preventive action can yield two types of benefit: (i) the "avoided costs" associated with violent outcomes that were prevented; and (ii) the direct benefits that flow from improved social, political and economic conditions.

To assess avoided costs, an assessor will hypothesize one or more violent outcomes of a conflict. Then, the assessor will estimate the various costs associated with such outcomes. The abovementioned Saferworld study could provide guidance for the conduct of these estimates (Cranna et al, 1994). When the avoided costs of a hypothesized violent outcome have been estimated, these costs should be considered in light of the likelihood (see our previous discussion about assessing effectiveness) that the violent outcome would have occurred, with and without the preventive action.

Preventive actions may be integrated with programs that promote other objectives, such as economic development. Also, preventive actions will often work by improving social, political or economic conditions. Such improvements will provide direct benefits to a variety of parties. For example, if a preventive action is sponsored by an entity outside the conflict area (e.g., the United States), that entity might receive direct benefits from the action (e.g., opportunities for trade and investment). Overall, the task of assessing the benefits gained through improved social, political or economic conditions is similar to the task of assessing benefits from foreign aid. There is considerable experience with such assessment. That experience should be evaluated to determine its applicability to the problem of assessing direct benefits from preventive actions.

* ASSESSING COSTS

The most easily assessed costs of a preventive action are of those of a direct, material nature. Such costs will include salaries and logistical support for personnel engaged in preventive actions, deaths and injuries suffered by such personnel in the course of their duties, economic assistance that has a preventive purpose, etc. There are also non-material and indirect costs, which are harder to assess. Two examples may illustrate. First, a preventive action by a government might involve the expenditure of scarce political capital; this could be a significant non-material cost. Second, a preventive action might establish an ongoing dependency within an assisted country; this could be a significant indirect cost.

A curious feature of the contemporary world, given the intellectual effort that is lavished on international security issues, is the lack of data on the resources and expenditures that are devoted to preventive actions. A recent study found a lack of systematic data across all the countries surveyed, reflecting each country's lack of an integrated strategy for preventing deadly conflict (Renner, 1994). Thus, while the assessment of the costs of a preventive action may be conceptually

straightforward, the necessary data may have to be acquired from primary sources. This process can be time-consuming, but will yield valuable data.

6. Assembling Evidence

In this guide, IRSS assumes that evidence will be obtained through a case study approach. Each case study will review experience with one or more preventive actions in a selected situation. A case study could proceed as an entirely written exercise, or it could be developed partly through group discussion. In either case, a standardized format will be useful, and we propose such a format.

Whether developed through group discussion or as a written exercise, a case study should be exposed during its development to a range of criticism. Often, the authors of a case study will be proponents or practitioners of the preventive action under consideration. Such authors will be well informed about the preventive action, but their description could be biased. Even if the authors have no direct connection with the preventive action, their description may nevertheless be incomplete or biased. Exposure of the case study to a group of peers will improve the quality of the study and enhance its credibility.

Appendices A and B are dossiers on two case studies. These case studies are being developed through a process that IRSS recommends. The process has six steps, of which three have been completed for the two case studies. First, the case study authors made an oral presentation at a seminar attended by a group of peers. Second, the case was discussed by the seminar participants. Third, both the presentation and the discussion were documented using IRSS's proposed format. Fourth, IRSS is making this documentation widely available, through publication in this guide and through other channels, including electronic channels. Fifth, we will hold each dossier open for the incorporation of additional information and critiques that are brought to IRSS's attention. Sixth, after some period the original authors will be offered the opportunity to revise their case study description.

Before choosing this process, IRSS took guidance from a group of distinguished experts who attended a workshop in March 1995 (Thompson, 1995). Those experts generally supported the case study approach and IRSS's proposal to develop case studies through seminars, but they recommended that caution be exercised. Three areas seem particularly deserving of caution. First, case studies can be controversial, especially when failure is alleged; thus, seminars should be carefully facilitated to ensure a constructive atmosphere in which honest appraisal is promoted. Second, the standardized case study format should be developed incrementally, with responsiveness to users' needs. Third, the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness and benefits of preventive actions should not be overly emphasized, because the effectiveness and benefits of other instruments of international security (e.g., nuclear deterrence) are equally difficult to assess.

The evidence that will be presented in a case study will be diverse in nature. Sometimes, this evidence will be circumstantial, anecdotal, incomplete or

inconsistent. Much of it will be qualitative rather than quantitative. Case study authors must remember that they can rarely make an objectively defensible assessment of the effectiveness or benefits of a preventive action. Instead, their task is to present a body of evidence that will help a reader to reach a reasoned judgement. Authors can and should present their own opinions, but they should also present the evidence on which those opinions are based.

IRSS's proposed format for presenting evidence is set out on the following page. The format provides for seven major categories of discussion. Within each category, key points of discussion are suggested. We welcome comments on this format, which will evolve in response to users' needs.

A Proposed Format for Presenting Evidence in a Case Study

I. INTRODUCTION

Key points: identification of case study authors and their organizations; outline of case study; issues of definition and methodology.

II. THE CONFLICT SITUATION

Key points: type of conflict; description of the parties; geographic boundaries; timeframe of conflict; sources of conflict.

III. OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT

Key points: history of violence in this situation; scenarios of potential violence (at varying scales of geography, number of participants, level of violence, etc.); factors that may affect the development of the conflict (e.g., economic trends, political developments, external influences); costs of previous and potential violence; other costs of the conflict.

IV. APPLICATION OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

Key points: types of preventive action; description of intervenors; targets of the intervention (geographic area, identities of parties, etc.); timeframe of the intervention; related preventive actions and intervenors; history of intervention in this situation.

V. OUTCOMES OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

Key points: categories of observed or potential outcome; means for assessing outcomes (assessment methodologies, nature of the assessors, etc.); findings from past assessments; schedule for future assessments; experience with similar preventive actions in other situations.

VI. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

Key points: categories of benefit and cost; identification of parties that receive benefits or bear costs; timeframes of benefits and costs; methods for analyzing benefits and costs; findings from past analyses; schedule for future analyses.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Key points: summary of findings; strengths and limitations of this case study.

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Appendix A

Dossier on a Case Study:

"Progress towards resolving an 'intractable' conflict: the case of Cyprus"

NAME OF CASE STUDY:

Progress towards resolving an 'intractable' conflict: the case of Cyprus

AUTHORS OF CASE STUDY:

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1819 H Street NW, Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20006, USA

PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDY:

This study was first presented at a seminar held at the offices of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, Washington, DC, on November 17th, 1995.

ITEMS IN THIS DOSSIER:

- (1) Text of the presentation by Louise Diamond and John McDonald on November 17th, 1995.
- (2) Summary of the discussion that followed the presentation by Louise Diamond and John McDonald.
- (3) List of participants in the seminar on November 17th, 1995.

DOSSIER ITEM NUMBER (1)

**Text of the presentation by
Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
November 17th, 1995**
(text has been edited by IRSS)

1. INTRODUCTION

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) is a small, nonprofit corporation, three and a half years old, with an office in downtown Washington. We take a systems approach to peace. This presentation, which focuses on Cyprus, illustrates our varied work on the nonviolent resolution of inter-communal conflicts. In addition to working in Cyprus, we currently have projects in Israel, Palestine, Liberia, and Cuba, and are working with the Government of Tibet-in-exile.

John McDonald's involvement in this type of work goes back at least 10 years. Joseph Montville first coined the phrase "Track Two Diplomacy" when he and McDonald were colleagues at the State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. They decided to pursue this concept further, and convened a seminar that brought people from various communities outside of government together to talk about what they were able to do as private citizens in the field of foreign affairs. Out of the seminar came a document, intended for government publication, called "Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy". The bureaucracy intervened and held up publication for about 18 months. They were threatened by the fact that there was going to be a publication, under the State Department label, which acknowledged that there was another way to do business in foreign affairs besides "Track One" or government-to-government interaction. McDonald finally got this publication through the bureaucracy. It was widely disseminated and well received.

The concept was subsequently expanded to five tracks. Then, Louise Diamond and John McDonald produced a book, called "Multi-Track Diplomacy", which expanded the concept to nine tracks, in a circle form. Track One is government-to-government interaction. Track Two is professional conflict resolution practice. Track Three is interaction by the business community, which is often left out of people's thinking about opportunities in the foreign affairs field. Track Four is work by private citizens, including citizen-to-citizen exchanges and the work of non-government organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Track Five is education and training. Track Six is peace activism. Track Seven is religion. Track Eight is funding. Because we are non-profit and don't charge a fee for our services, we have to raise money to do our international work. The ninth track is the inner circle which binds all the others together, and is basically a communications track.

IMTD doesn't do arbitration, alternative dispute resolution, mediation, or negotiation. We stay out of trying to solve the political problems of the conflicts

that we enter. We do facilitation, dialogue and, most importantly, training. We work with community leaders on the grass roots level, building on their existing capabilities, providing them with conflict resolution skills and helping them to apply these skills within their own lives and eventually in their own conflict. A long-term goal we have is that when a peace treaty has been signed and the government peacekeepers have withdrawn from the situation, people we have trained will work at the grassroots level and stop the cycle of violence. That's a long term goal, to be a basic part of peace building and conflict prevention.

Once we have trained local groups, we move more deeply into the conflict. We call this process "transformative social change". We look at the root causes of the conflict and evaluate with people how it started in the first place. We discuss how to cope with the anger and fear that people live with. Our work is based on a set of important principles. We are always invited into a conflict, we never impose ourselves. We go and listen. We try to determine how we can help, and then we work together with those people who are willing to take the risks to work with us. With their help we design something that they feel should be helpful to them. We then contact the Track One players and let them know that we are not a threat to them because we are not negotiating peace settlements. In order to build trust relationships with the people who work with us, we make a long term commitment to the conflict. We don't have a hidden agenda. Of course, we then have to raise the money to do what we do. That is an overview of the IMTD process and philosophy.

2. THE CONFLICT SITUATION

Cyprus is a very lovely island located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Recent archaeological digs date the island's history back at least as far as 6,000 BC, and Cyprus has been a part of many empires over the millennia. Most recently, Cyprus was a part of the British empire, but in August 1960 it became an independent nation. At that point about 80 percent of the population were Greek-Cypriots and 20 percent were Turkish-Cypriots. In November 1963 a civil war broke out and the UN Security Council decided to put a peacekeeping force on the island. The UN peacekeepers arrived in March 1964, and are still there. A UN mediation effort has so far been unsuccessful in securing a signed peace accord between the two communities.

In July 1974 there was an attempted coup against Archbishop Makarios by people who wanted the island to join with Greece itself. Turkey then sent in troops, and the island's territory was divided along what is known as the Green Line. Today about one third of the island, the northern part, is controlled by Turkish-Cypriots, while the remaining two-thirds portion is controlled by the Greek-Cypriots. In 1983 the northern part declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which today is recognized only by Turkey. The Greek-Cypriots are the only internationally recognized government on the island. A fascinating thing about the current situation is that, since 1974, a whole generation of Cypriots has grown up hating the other side, while never having met them. This is because the two parts of the island are sealed off from each other. There is virtually no access across the Green Line, in

person, by phone or by letter. That isolation helps to make this an intractable conflict.

There was a complete population exchange, gradually from 1963 on and then fully in 1974, so that virtually all Turkish-Cypriots are in the North and Greek-Cypriots are in the South. About 180,00 Greek-Cypriots left their homes in the North as refugees in the 1974 violence. The UN peacekeepers man the Green Line all across the island. In contrast to the situation in Israel, where a similar line has been erased physically but remains a psychological barrier, in Cyprus it is a very physical barrier.

A recent experience of IMTD illustrates the profound influence of the Green Line. IMTD was working with some of our most senior partners in Cyprus in an advanced "training of trainers" program. These partners, under our guidance, were doing a training workshop for local people. In this workshop they were putting on a skit about the relationship between the two communities. At one point in the skit they placed a piece of tape across the floor and colored it green. That was the Green Line, and half the group were Greek-Cypriots while the other half were Turkish-Cypriots. The skit continued and eventually the participants all fell down on the floor and went to sleep. As they were asleep someone came and peeled off the tape and literally removed the Green Line. In the morning the participants woke up and there was no Green Line. They had to figure out what to do and if they could cross it. They went through an incredible song and dance about: "What do you do when you wake up in the morning and there is no more Green Line?"

That skit was a powerful metaphor for IMTD about why we are in Cyprus. We are not there to bring people to the table and get a peace agreement, although we hope this eventually happens, and that our work contributes to it. But there is a lot more to erasing the Green Line than simply signing an agreement. If the line is to truly disappear, people have to figure out: "What do we do, how do we think, how do we feel, how do we live, how do we relate?" That is the focus of our work. We don't primarily think of it as a preventive diplomacy project. Of course, we hope that the work we are doing will help to break the cycle of violence and thereby prevent the outbreak of further violence. More fundamentally, we hope that our work will transform the deeply rooted ways of thinking and acting that have grown in this part of the world over hundreds of years. Our work is about healing and transforming as much as it is about preventing violence.

3. OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT

The recent history of violence in Cyprus includes two distinct periods of intercommunal violence. Although in both cases there were abuses and atrocities on both sides, the Turkish-Cypriots point to the period beginning 1963 as the time when they were the primary victims of violence and harassment at the hands of the Greek-Cypriots, and the Greek-Cypriots point to 1974, when they were the primary victims of armed aggression from the Turkish troops.

Those two periods of particularly marked violence are what people refer to when asked about the island's potential for suffering. But that is just on the surface. When you peel back the layers of people's perceptions, you go back to the fall of Constantinople, to the Crusades, to the whole history of the Greeks, the Turks, and the civilizations of the Ottoman and Byzantine empires. All this history has an important influence on the island, as does the current relationship of Greece and Turkey.

In the modern context, the Greek-Turkish relationship has a crucial influence on Cyprus. Thus, the Cold War may be over, but a lesser cold war between Greece and Turkey is still being played out, with Cyprus as a surrogate. As a result, the geographic and political boundaries of the Cyprus conflict are much broader than the island, including all of the eastern Mediterranean, and all the places and contexts in which Turkey and Greece confront each other. Cyprus is a factor in regional affairs, and certainly receives the fallout from other regional tensions.

The Cyprus conflict has historical roots, in the clash of civilizations and religions. The current situation will be described by local citizens in a more limited time frame of 30 or 40 years, but the pain underneath their daily lives goes back in a deeper way. Thus, when discussing root causes of the conflict, we need to be clear about the period we are talking about. In our work on Cyprus we have identified the following basic issues: the need for the identity of each side to be respected; the right of two peoples to live without fear of domination, one by the other; and the needs for equality, fairness, recognition, and partnership.

The parties are trying to negotiate some kind of political partnership, which is very difficult given the historical passions. The partnership is also very difficult to develop because of the numerical division, about 80 percent Greek-Cypriots and 20 percent Turkish-Cypriots. The people in the 80 percent majority do not want to form a fifty-fifty partnership when they have 80 percent of the population and more than that of the resources. The two entities are also imbalanced in a number of other ways. The Republic of Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriot side, is the only internationally recognized body, so the term "Cyprus", by international law, refers only to the Greek-Cypriot republic. The government on the Turkish-Cypriot side is recognized only by Turkey. These circumstances have created differences in terminology that make it extremely difficult to find language acceptable to both parties to discuss the situation.

The potential for violence in this situation is profound, because of the regional impact. On Cyprus itself the violence is pretty much under control, with the UN peacekeeping force there doing a very good job. The UN has been there a very long time and they really know what they are doing. Occasionally, there is a killing on the Green Line, almost always an accident, that usually doesn't result in anything more than demonstrations for a few days. However, increasingly, this area is affected by trends of nationalism. The more the two parts of the island remain separated, the more this nationalistic feeling is building up on both sides. The more

the ultra-nationalistic feeling builds up, the more people take to the streets. And the more they take to the streets the more opportunity there is for violence.

Recently, there has been a substantial military buildup on the Greek-Cypriot side, which is of particular concern because of the parallel growth of ultra-nationalist feelings. However, while the Greek-Cypriots are arming at a rapid rate, at the same time they are calling for the demilitarization of the entire island. They say they are willing to forgo their arms build-up if they obtain an agreement whereby the Turkish army, which continues to have a strong presence in the North, will leave. Turkey is very close to this island and planes from Turkey can arrive quickly. Greece is significantly further away and is a much weaker state right now. So the Greek-Cypriots are not irrational when they fear the military might of Turkey. The arms buildup is a common subject of discussion in Cyprus. Many people say: "How silly this buildup is. If the Greek-Cypriot state is arming to protect itself against Turkey, the buildup is too little, and if it is arming to protect itself against the Turkish-Cypriots, the buildup is too great."

So, the potential for violence is profound from two directions. Violence could break out on the island, because of the growth of nationalism, and because people are very frustrated. Turkish-Cypriots are leaving in alarming numbers. There are estimated to be as many or perhaps more Turkish-Cypriots off the island than are on the island. Turkish settlers from the mainland are continuing to come in, which is causing a lot of bitterness within the Greek-Cypriot community. Turkey is crowded, and it sends people to Cyprus as seasonal laborers, who may then move into villages and stay longer. The economic situation is very poor. Many things could contribute to strife on the island itself, and if violence broke out there, it would probably grow regionally. Violence could also spread in the reverse direction, from the region inward. If Greece and Turkey became engaged in a confrontation in the Aegean, this would probably play itself out in Cyprus as well.

4. APPLICATION OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

IMTD staff started working in Cyprus in 1991, before our institute was officially created. Louise Diamond was invited there by a Greek-Cypriot woman, and went to Cyprus under the sponsorship of the National Training Laboratories (NTL) Institute for Applied Behavioral Sciences, with the goal of simply seeing if there was some way we could make a contribution. Louise first met the people who had been involved in previous bi-communal contact. There was some history of such contact, facilitated by outside third parties, going back into the 1960s. John Burton did a problem-solving workshop, Leonard Doob of Yale University did some bi-communal dialogue work, and Ron Fisher from Canada did a problem-solving workshop just before Louise first went there.

But none of the outside interventions was ongoing, and intervention was still very difficult in 1991. It was almost impossible for people to meet each other in Cyprus. Turkish-Cypriots had to have permission from the Turkish military to go into the UN-administered buffer zone. Greek-Cypriots also had to run certain gauntlets,

and those who met people from the other side might expect to wake up the next morning to see their names in the newspapers, saying that they were traitors. There is even some history from the 1970s, where people who were working for peace were killed. So in 1991 it was not taken lightly on this island that people from the two sides would meet each other. That situation provides a baseline against which to measure the effects of our work.

Louise met with people who had done bi-communal work, heard their stories, and asked how we could help. The local people said very clearly: "We want you to give us the skills of conflict resolution, as tools in our own hands, so we can solve our own problems." So we started doing this very slowly, working separately in each community. We did public presentations and short workshops. Our work was not widely publicized, because it was very sensitive. We said it was conflict resolution training, and gave it a very academic flavor. Louise started working with a handful of people, and every time she visited Cyprus she would say to them: "I will come back in three months. If you want me to do something more, let me know. You arrange it and I will do it." The next time they would arrange something bigger and would have invited more of their friends. This went on for two years and it was a very important process of building trust, not only with Louise and her colleagues as third parties, but also among the local participants. IMTD brought together a variety of groups, including women and people from the different political parties and sought to build trust in the concept of conflict resolution. Through this process we gradually built an acceptance of conflict resolution practices and an eagerness to apply them in Cyprus.

After two years we finally were able to bring people from the North and the South together. We did this on the Green Line, in an old British hotel in the buffer zone that is now the headquarters for the UN peacekeeping force. This building has a room that the UN considers as its bi-communal room, and we were able to bring people together there for a weekend on two occasions in 1993. Over the previous two years we had developed a core group of people, about 25 on each side. From the minute we started bi-communal work we always insisted on operating on the principle of fifty-fifty participation. This is unusual because all the international aid that has come to the island (including 15 million dollars a year from the United States) goes to the island on the basis of an 80-20 split. This means that the Greek-Cypriots, who need it the least, get 80 percent of the aid and the Turkish-Cypriots, whose economy is like that of a third world community, get 20 percent. We said, without taking any sides in any political process, that our dialogue and training work requires 50-50 participation. We didn't go into a big justification for it, we just said: "That's how it is".

Out of a large core group we selected 10 from each side and, in August 1993, took them to Oxford, England for a 10-day residential intensive training in conflict resolution. For the first time, for many, they got to sit with someone from the other side, eat with them, sleep in the same building with them, drink a beer with them, talk with them, cry, dance, and sing with "the enemy, the barbarian." At the same time they learned some basic conflict resolution skills, including communication,

problem solving, conflict analysis, and action planning. Although the meeting was very basic it was profoundly transformative. There were some influential actors in this multi-track group. Almost all of the nine tracks were represented (except the philanthropic community). There were well placed and influential politicians and community leaders from both sides, acting in their personal capacity. Their participation had important implications for the ensuing work.

Our work was done with the full knowledge of the local political leadership and the US Embassy. Every time IMTD came to the island, we visited these leaders. We never asked their permission, but told them what we were doing. There was no secrecy, but we did not advertise our activities and did not give newspaper or television interviews, in order to provide some level of safety for the local participants. We let the local participants decide how much exposure they wanted.

Two important things happened when the 20-person group returned from Oxford to Cyprus. First, immediately upon their return, the Greek-Cypriots found themselves walking into a media attack, the likes of which no one expected. It was a vicious, distorted attack manufactured by the ultra-nationalist press. It went beyond calling people traitors. It accused our participants of trying to conduct secret negotiations behind the back of the government. It accused the government of not knowing about the Oxford workshops. The government itself joined the attacks for a while until it realized that it did indeed know about the workshops. It then apologized. This went on for a month or so. The Greek-Cypriots who were involved in the workshops received threatening phone calls, some received bomb threats, some had threats to their jobs. Difficulties continued for a long time afterwards. Some participants received threats against their children and their families. These threats were taken very seriously. Some participants are still, to this day, vulnerable in their professional lives because of their involvement in the Oxford workshop and their continued involvement in the process.

These personal difficulties might be termed a cost of the process, but actually they produced an enormous benefit, namely that our participants responded to the attacks by banding together. They said: "OK, this is a place where we can either fold quietly, or we can make a clear statement about how valuable the bi-communal process is." They chose the latter course. So they went on television and talked to the media. They let themselves be attacked, particularly by the nationalist media. They demonstrated the skills that they had learned, for all the island to see, and the public was astounded. Our participants were stopped in the street, and colleagues at work asked how it was that they were able to talk to people on the other side. Some people didn't know this was even possible. Our participants were also complimented on how well they handled themselves in the face of the difficult attacks that were aimed at them. This brought the whole issue of bi-communal contact into public discourse in a new way, making the issue accessible to the entire island. Our work became credible in a way it never would have if we had planned any type of media campaign.

One year later a similar situation occurred on the Turkish side. On both sides, our work became credible because the entire population saw private citizens acting in an extremely courageous way, being willing to get up and say: "Yes, I did this, and this is what it gave me. I'm willing to do more, and intend to do so. Why don't you join me?" After that, people did start joining, by the hundreds. Not only did the general population give its support, but members of the power elite also joined in and participated as well.

5. OUTCOMES OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

As soon as the larger international community saw the effect of our work, they also started to joined the effort. The Fulbright Commission in Cyprus requested the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to fund additional conflict resolution work in the Island. At this point we expanded our consortium and included the Conflict Management Group (CMG), based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. This was significant because we found a way to partner with a different actor in our field. The consortium then obtained a 650 thousand dollar contract from the USAID, to train 200 people within a six-month period. This we did in the summer of 1994. Among these trainees was a group of 40 politicians, 20 from each side. They would never have been able to meet with each other before we started this work. Because of the success of the Oxford workshop, and because there were political people who stepped forward and spoke up for our work, it gained political credibility. Also, the US Ambassador personally invited people to attend training sessions, some of which occurred in the United States.

Thus, we expanded the process from a core group of 20 people, in Oxford, to 200 in one year. We met at the Green Line, where participants were able to take each other across to the other side. The Turkish-Cypriots took the Greek-Cypriots to the North, where they hadn't been for 20 years, and vice versa. They took them back to their villages, to their homes. The visitors took pictures, they took plantings of olive trees back to their families. This would happen in the evenings after our workshops. In the morning, people would share their stories, amid tears and explanations. Those people all have families and friends, who saw this exchange and met people from the other side. This exchange of visits challenged the status quo, and was stopped, but not before there was a change of perceptions about what people believe about each other and what is possible.

Those 200 people magnified their experiences at least ten-fold through the public activities they convened, including seminars, talks, university classes, cultural exchanges, and other projects. The Fulbright Commission supported the work by hiring a full-time conflict resolution professional to be on the ground for 9 months. He has continued the work with the existing group and has added new projects and participants to the overall bi-communal effort. He has since been rehired for another 9 months. Fifteen bi-communal projects have been organized, focussed on issues such as Cyprus' relationship to the European Union, the environment, women's studies, and cultural and educational exchanges.

We now have a second USAID contract that will run for three more years, during which time we will provide yet more training. We are moving into work with specialized groups, especially politicians, business leaders, educators, journalists, and teenagers. We run programs for each of these groups separately, and at times we mix some of them up. These are the segments of the population that have the most leverage for social transformation. We have also done advanced training for trainers, 15 people from each side who are now running conflict resolution programs on their own, without us, reaching scores of additional people.

The effect in Cyprus has been much greater than might be concluded from the numbers of people who have attended our workshops. Throughout the society, the norms have changed. Now, permissions for citizen exchanges are more numerous. There is a bi-communal conflict resolution center at the Green Line, to which people have permanent monthly passes and can come and go as they please. This was unheard of three years ago. In the last election in the North, both candidates for the presidency announced their support for the concept of conflict resolution. People whom we have trained are now on official negotiating teams.

At the very beginning of the project, we started with a clear concept of evaluation. Many project managers don't think about evaluation until halfway through or at the end. This is not the way to do it. From the beginning, particularly in Oxford, we have had a pre-training questionnaire and a post-training questionnaire. Because we have been working in Cyprus for so long, we are also able to conduct long-term evaluations that ask how things are going at intervals of 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year after a workshop. These long-term evaluations are usually not by questionnaire but by one-on-one interviews. The format for the evaluation has become standardized over time. We try to involve local people in the evaluation process, and we have local evaluation teams. In our evaluations, we use four categories of outcomes: consciousness; competence; connection; and continuing capacity.

By consciousness, we mean what is going on in the hearts and minds of people who are directly involved in our activities and people that they have relationships with. From the questionnaires, people report profound changes in how they think and how they relate to one another, their families, and their colleagues. As an example, a Greek-Cypriot journalist came to one of our sessions. He was "Mr. News" on the government-sponsored television channel, and was considered very nationalist. A year later, he reported that he was personally transformed by his experience with us. He was going into the North to gather news, when he wouldn't set foot there before. He was fired at one point because he refused to use some of the politically charged language that the station wanted him to use. He could see the damage this language does. Later, the station rehired him, because nobody else could do what he was doing. The findings from our questionnaires show similar effects, almost across the board, in our participants.

Competence refers to the development of skills. We ask people to say what skills they have taken away from the training events, and what skills they are using

where, how and with what results. People report that they find particular use for communication skills. We do a lot of Aikido training, martial arts training, in our workshops, using Aikido as a metaphor for conflict resolution. People generally report that this is the single greatest skill that they have learned, because it gives them a whole new way of understanding how to be in a situation of attack, how to be centered, and how to be with the enemy in a way that moves the common agenda forward. It is so visual and visceral that people get it right away. When we have been in large public meetings with people who have participated in our workshops, we could see, when the attacks became vitriolic, who was practicing the principles of Aikido and who was not.

Connection refers to how people are working with one another. As mentioned above, fifteen bi-communal projects are under way, and several hundred people have been trained. Many of the people who come for training say they want more. Also, they find ways to keep in touch with each other. There is no way for Greek and Turkish-Cypriots to telephone each other unless they go through the UN switchboard. When we started, the logistics for this were very complicated. One had to get permission from the UN and had to justify the call. But now, the people who work with us know that they can use this facility, and the switchboard is being swamped with calls, so much so that users have asked the UN to put in another line. Now, both sides are beginning to hook up to the Internet, so that connection will be truly unstoppable. People are full of ideas as to how to connect with each other and to keep the connection going. They are bringing their children together. For its fiftieth anniversary, the UN sponsored an open festival day for families. This had been tried before with fair response, but for this UN anniversary there were approximately six thousand people, many of whom were part of our work.

Continuing capacity includes institutionalization. People are struggling with this. The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot conflict resolution trainers now feel confident that they can do the training on their own. People there are being asked to go to international conferences and to talk about the Cyprus situation, as international experts. There is a Bi-communal Steering Committee, that we set up very early on, in 1992, before doing any bi-communal training, with the intention that the committee would take ownership on an institutional level. This is now occurring. There is an emerging concern about quality control, as more and more conflict resolution practitioners are coming to Cyprus to work. The Bi-communal Steering Committee is doing the screening and is organizing events. There is a Peace Center on the Greek side that pre-dates our work but has become the main institution on the Greek side to support this work, and all of its board members are core players. The Turkish-Cypriots have been discouraged from setting up institutions, so they have to operate more informally. There is also the bi-communal center on the Green Line.

It is hard to evaluate this type of work, even through the systematic interviews and questionnaires that we use. These tools don't catch the full effect of the work. For instance, we heard from some Turkish-Cypriot politicians, one year after our workshop, that they realized, subsequent to the workshop, that their relationship

with Turkey was too dependent and that they could not stand on their own if this relationship continued, much less interact productively with the Greek-Cypriots. So they visited the Turkish embassy in Northern Cyprus, and influenced the Turkish government to change its foreign policy so that the Turkish-Cypriots could be more independent economically. It is hard to determine how much of this change is due to the work we did with these politicians. Also, there have been attempts at secret negotiations, clearly as a result of our work, but their impact is not yet clear.

6. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

We have not systematically investigated the benefits and costs of the preventive actions, including ours, that have been taken in Cyprus. However, we do know the direct cost of IMTD's work, and we have no doubt that this work has been a highly cost-effective investment.

For the initial two years of our involvement in Cyprus, including the Oxford workshops, IMTD spent approximately 150 thousand dollars. Funds were obtained from various sources, including foundations and our own pockets. The National Training Laboratories made a large contribution. Then, the Cyprus Consortium (IMTD, CMG, and NTL) obtained a 650 thousand dollar contract from USAID, bringing our total expenditures through 1994 to 800 thousand dollars. To that should be added local costs of approximately 200 thousand dollars. Therefore, the first three years of the project cost one million dollars.

Our next three-year contract from USAID will come to about one million dollars, which includes a full-time scholar on the ground, paid for by the Fulbright Commission. So, altogether, the cost of our work, in the past and the immediate future, comes to about 2 million dollars over 6 years.

The benefits of this work fall into two major categories. In one category are the avoided costs of potential future violence. These costs could be borne by people both within and outside Cyprus, because of the regional nature of this conflict. In the second category are the direct benefits that will flow from the social transformation we seek to promote in Cyprus.

It is important to note that the social costs of the Cyprus conflict have been spread throughout both communities. Most people on the island are in some way personally connected with the difficult events of the 1960s and 1970s. Cyprus is a small island, and it operates like a village. Everybody knows everybody. Even though the capital, Nicosia, is a modern European industrialized city, just under the surface there is a very traditional village culture. People are very tight with one another. It is a tribal culture that has a group consciousness, for both the Greeks and the Turks. Therefore, anything that happened to "our people" has happened to us, even if it happened several hundred years ago, but particularly if it happened to my grandfather, my father, my sister, or my brother. So every person on the island has suffered. This suffering has become embedded in the educational system, the newspapers, and the daily lives of the people. It is the focus of attention of

everybody on the island every single day, even though there may be no actual violence going on. It is called the Cyprus problem.

This problem brings opportunity costs, in the form of forgone economic and social opportunities. The effect seems particularly evident in the North. There has been a growing disparity, economically speaking, between the North and the South since 1960. The Greek-Cypriot South now has a per capita GNP which is three times that of the North, although the Turkish-Cypriots in the North have control of the best farming and tourist land on the island. The social transformation that we seek to promote will open up new opportunities for both sides.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The Cyprus situation has defied the formal diplomatic efforts of the UN and various governments and community leaders for over 30 years. Thus, at the political level of peacebuilding, Cyprus remains stalemated. The multi-track work of IMTD and its Consortium partners has, however, created an infrastructure at the institutional and social levels of peacebuilding that appears to be both well-established and effective.

This human network, or "conflict resolution movement", has demonstrated its ability to open and sustain bi-communal contacts, develop local capacity for problem solving and conflict resolution, establish enduring bi-communal relationships, and offer direct experiences of shared learning and cooperation.

While it would appear that this human infrastructure has been successful in giving credibility to a new level of dialogue between private citizens of both communities, and presumably for bringing new ideas into the discourse about the Cyprus situation, it is not possible to determine with any accuracy the direct correlation of this effort on preventing further outbreaks of violence or on resolving at the political level the conundrums of the Cyprus conflict.

DOSSIER ITEM NUMBER (2)

Summary, by IRSS, of the discussion that followed a presentation by Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy November 17th, 1995

1. INTRODUCTION

This document summarizes the discussion that followed IMTD's presentation. For the convenience of the reader, this summary is organized according to the same format as was used for the presentation. The actual discussion did not follow this sequence. This summary was prepared by the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS), which is solely responsible for its content. Factual statements are reported here, drawing from discussion at the seminar. IRSS has not independently verified these statements.

2. THE CONFLICT SITUATION

No significant additional discussion occurred regarding the conflict situation in Cyprus.

3. OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT

Some discussion occurred regarding the potential for violence in connection with Cyprus. This discussion focussed on the United States' alliance with Greece and Turkey through NATO. An escalation of the cold war between Greece and Turkey would threaten the cohesion of NATO and would therefore be of major concern to Washington. Moreover, US forces might become caught up in hostilities between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus is a potential flashpoint in the Greek-Turkish confrontation. Thus, US national security would benefit from a resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

4. APPLICATION OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

The role of the United Nations in Cyprus was discussed. It was said that there are now about 1200 UN peacekeeping troops in Cyprus, whereas in the past there have been several thousand. The UN member states have grown tired of paying for peacekeepers while nothing has happened to resolve the conflict, so they have cut back. Canada has been a major contributor of soldiers, and peacekeeping troops have also been sent by Britain, the United States, Australia, Austria and the Netherlands. This particular peacekeeping mission is not paid for out of the usual peacekeeping pool. The Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot state) contributes towards the cost of the mission.

It was pointed out that the UN plays a major political role. The Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General is based on Cyprus and has been involved in negotiations for 30 years. Many individuals have held this office.

The UN representative has become a fixed part of the political scene in Cyprus. Recent holders of this office have encouraged bi-communal activities, for example by giving personal support to participants and by attending events. Also, the UN provides facilities at the Green Line for bi-communal events.

The UN also plays a humanitarian role, through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For some time, the United States has been sending about 15 million dollars a year of aid to Cyprus. Of this, 10 million dollars goes to UNHCR and 5 million dollars to the Fulbright Commission. A considerable part of the 10 million dollars that goes to UNHCR is used for bi-communal projects. These projects have been exclusively technical in nature, encompassing sewage systems and medical, environmental, or architectural projects. Funds for UNHCR projects have been split on an 80-20 basis (80 percent to the Greek-Cypriots), so the projects have run into political problems. Prior to IMTD's involvement in Cyprus, the UNHCR projects provided the only institutionalized opportunity for sustained bi-communal contact.

Some people at the seminar questioned whether the UN could have undertaken the type of work that IMTD and the Cyprus Consortium have done in Cyprus. It was generally agreed that the UN does not have a mandate to do this kind of work, and that UN officials have a role in the conflict that precludes their effective participation in such work. Thus, only non-government organizations can take the kind of initiative that IMTD has taken.

Questions were asked about IMTD's training agenda. IMTD responded that training should be seen as a vehicle for pursuing other objectives. Because the two sides in Cyprus have had little opportunity to talk to each other, they are at least as interested in discussing substantive issues as in learning conflict resolution skills. Thus, IMTD combines the two activities, using the Cyprus conflict as a case study. IMTD first presents a conceptual framework for conflict transformation. Participants then analyze their conflict, especially its root causes and the needs underlying parties' positions. Participants learn to separate needs, interests and positions. They examine a variety of measures that can promote social transformation. All of these subjects offer opportunities for skills transfer and for discussion of substantive issues. With this approach, people learn the skills better because those skills are immediately and directly relevant to their daily lives. Also, there is a safe and structured environment in which to deal with issues. IMTD emphasized that it does not provide training in negotiation, or in searching for an official solution, but in the preparatory work that needs to be done toward that end.

The Cyprus Consortium now plans to work with more specialized groups (e.g., journalists, political leaders), tailoring the curriculum to their specific needs. For the political leaders, IMTD and CMG are creating a new project, not supported by the USAID contract. This is a research project to identify the common elements in intractable conflicts, and the relation of these elements to Cyprus. It will also involve training in systems analysis and scenario building. The Bi-

communal Steering Committee, set up by IMTD in 1992, will coordinate future activities by IMTD and others, including the Fulbright Commission.

The role of journalists was discussed. It was argued that the involvement of journalists in a process of the kind that IMTD and the Cyprus Consortium has run in Cyprus can have tremendous multiplier effects. Thus, testimony from significant journalists and other people who influence public opinion, describing their change of perspective after participating in such a process, may convince even cynical observers. It was suggested that the effect of journalists' involvement could be measured, over a period of years, by the level of vitriol in the media. The US Information Agency does monitor foreign media but, at present, lacks the capability to detect this type of effect.

One seminar participant recalled IMTD's four evaluation categories -- consciousness, competence, connection, and (continuing) capacity -- and suggested that courage was also important to the outcome. For example, when attendees at the Oxford workshops encountered hostility on their return, they could have backed away from further involvement, but chose not to. Discussion of this phenomenon identified two major factors that promoted the display of courage. First, the individuals selected themselves for their role. Second, IMTD's work had helped to create an alternative community which provided support to the individuals being attacked.

5. OUTCOMES OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

A limited discussion occurred regarding the outcomes of preventive actions that have been taken by IMTD and others in Cyprus. This discussion is summarized in the following section, which addresses the benefits and costs of preventive actions.

6. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

There was a general discussion of the benefits and costs associated with preventive actions such as IMTD's and the Cyprus Consortium's work in Cyprus. It was pointed out that benefits and costs can be either qualitative or quantitative. Monetary benefits and costs are part, but only a part, of the quantitative benefits and costs. Also, for this kind of preventive action, most of the potential benefits are actually the avoided costs of conflict. These avoided costs include the ongoing costs of the present conflict -- the cost of the UN peacekeeping mission, lost economic opportunities in Cyprus, etc. -- and the potential costs of an escalated conflict. There are inevitable uncertainties in the estimation and attribution of avoided costs. Thus, if the conflict in Cyprus is resolved during the coming years, the potential costs of an escalated conflict will be avoided. But, how large might those costs have been? Similarly, if the conflict is resolved, its ongoing costs will be avoided, which will be an unambiguous benefit. But, to what influences can this benefit be attributed? The

work of IMTD and its Consortium partners is an important influence, but other factors have also been influential in Cyprus.

The various categories of benefits and costs are not equally shared by all the parties involved. For example, in most conflicts there are groups that benefit from continuation of the conflict, even though the larger society is suffering. As another example, a preventive action might be paid for by one party, but yield benefits to a wider group of parties. (In the economics lexicon, this is known as the free rider problem.) Also, a period of many years may elapse between the initiation of a preventive action and the realization of the benefit from that action.

For the United States, the ongoing costs of the Cyprus conflict are foreign aid, the US share of Cyprus-related UN costs, and lost opportunities for trade and investment. The potential costs to the US of an escalated conflict are much greater than the ongoing costs, because of the NATO alliance with Greece and Turkey. In an escalated conflict, the United States could experience monetary and political costs and, conceivably, casualties among US personnel. The ongoing costs to the US of foreign aid and support of the UN's Cyprus mission provide a corresponding benefit, in the sense that they reduce the probability of an escalated conflict. The recent allocation of USAID funds to the Consortium's work provides a further potential benefit to the United States, in the sense that this work increases the probability that the conflict will be resolved.

Some discussion occurred about the free rider problem in connection with Cyprus. Specifically, it was pointed out that the benefits of a resolution of the Cyprus conflict will accrue to European nations at least as much as they do to the United States. Yet, neither the European Union nor any European national government has supported work comparable to that done by IMTD. Indeed, IMTD has tried without success to obtain EU funds for its Cyprus work. This lack of success was said to reflect a general European reluctance to support conflict management ventures that are initiated and run by US-based organizations, even if they are non-government organizations. Unfortunately, Europe's capability for conflict resolution and management is less developed than the capability of the United States, at both governmental and non-governmental levels. Thus, the Europeans cannot do the job themselves, but resent paying Americans to do it.

The final point of discussion about benefits and costs was the cause-and-effect relationship between IMTD's work and the events that have occurred in Cyprus. Since the situation in Cyprus is complex, with a number of variables, can IMTD claim that its work has been a primary factor in changing the political or social climate? In response, IMTD pointed out that the Cyprus conflict has remained intractable for 30 years, during which period virtually all of the diplomacy has been of the Track One (governmental or UN) variety. IMTD has instituted a multi-track diplomatic effort that, in scale and continuity, goes well beyond any previous non-governmental effort. The correlation between this work and the

changed atmosphere for bi-communal contact is too strong to be a mere coincidence.

7. CONCLUSIONS

IMTD's presentation, and the subsequent discussion, were a pilot effort to test techniques for assembling evidence on the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive actions. The effort generated considerable information about the Cyprus conflict and about IMTD's involvement in the conflict. Much of this information is useful as evidence about preventive actions. However, further effort is needed to assemble a dossier of evidence that will allow a comprehensive, objective assessment of the effectiveness, benefits and costs of preventive actions in Cyprus.

DOSSIER ITEM NUMBER (3)

Participants in a Seminar on November 17th, 1995

This seminar was held at the offices of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, Washington, DC. The seminar featured a presentation by Louise Diamond and John McDonald, followed by discussion. The affiliations of participants are shown for identification purposes only.

Shahram Amadzadegan
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Glenn Baker
Center for Defense Information

Louise Diamond
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Sergio Farre
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Paula Gutlove
Institute for Resource and Security Studies

Mary Lord
ACCESS

Tara Magner
Winston Foundation for World Peace

John McDonald
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Joseph Montville
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mark Nichols
US Agency for International Development

Jamie Notter
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Paul Reimel
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Gordon Thompson
Institute for Resource and Security Studies

John Tirman
Winston Foundation for World Peace

Appendix B

Dossier on a Case Study:

"Tajikistan's humanitarian assistance success story"

NAME OF CASE STUDY:

Tajikistan's humanitarian assistance success story

AUTHORS OF CASE STUDY:

Mark Nichols
Office of Humanitarian Assistance
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US Agency for International Development
Washington, DC 20523, USA

PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDY:

This study was first presented at a seminar held at the offices of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, Washington, DC, on December 1st, 1995.

ITEMS IN THIS DOSSIER:

- (1) Text of the presentation by Mark Nichols on December 1st, 1995.
- (2) Summary of the discussion that followed the presentation by Mark Nichols.
- (3) List of participants in the seminar on December 1st, 1995.

DOSSIER ITEM NUMBER (1)

Text of the presentation by
Mark Nichols, US Agency for International Development
December 1st, 1995
(text has been edited by IRSS)

1. INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War era, the international community has faced a growing number of regional conflicts and humanitarian crises. Responding to these crises places enormous strain on our institutions and resources. Clearly, we need to find a new way of doing business. With a view toward preventing crises, conserving resources and creating a more stable world, we set out here to prove that preventive action (the term here is construed very broadly) is more effective and more cost-efficient than a policy of responding to conflicts piecemeal after they have erupted. It is a persuasive argument, but not an easy case to make. Proving that a preventive action actually prevented a conflict and saved the international community money (compared to what it would have spent had a conflict erupted) can be an excruciatingly difficult task. Nevertheless, we are going to make the case, based on our experience in Tajikistan, that preventive action does work and saves money.

This paper examines the effectiveness of international humanitarian interventions in Tajikistan after the 1992 civil war, and argues that humanitarian assistance has contributed to stability and created an environment in which to build peace. Thus, humanitarian assistance in Tajikistan can be viewed from two perspectives: first, as a means of mitigating the effects of an episode of violence; second, as a preventive action, helping to prevent renewed violence.

Using a standardized format developed for presentations of this kind, the next five sections of this paper describe the conflict situation, the outcomes of conflict, the application of preventive actions, the outcomes of preventive actions, and the benefits and costs of preventive actions. The paper ends with some brief conclusions.

2. THE CONFLICT SITUATION

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a major struggle for power erupted in Tajikistan. This struggle, which had ethnic, religious and regional overtones, led to the disastrous civil war which engulfed Tajikistan from May to December 1992. The war was fought between Garmis and Pamiris on one side and Kulyabis and Leninabaders on the other. A coalition government was briefly established, from September through November 1992, but was quickly abolished when the Kulyabis and their Leninabader allies realized they had the upper hand. In December 1992, the former Chairman of Parliament, Imamoli Rahmanov, became head of state.

Since 1993, the situation in Tajikistan has stabilized, with the conflict confined to the Tajik-Afghan border and areas controlled by the Tajik Opposition. Presidential and Parliamentary elections and a referendum on a new constitution were held in November 1994 and February 1995, respectively, with Rahmanov and his Kulyabi brethren winning in a landslide victory. Peace talks between the Government and the Opposition have also begun under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Four rounds have taken place and a fifth is beginning right now in Ashkabad. While negotiations have mainly broadened the ceasefire, the fifth round, it is hoped, will bring about the first steps of political compromise toward national reconciliation.

3. OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT

Approximately 50 thousand people were killed during the 1992 civil war. About 500 thousand others - nearly one-tenth of the country's 5.4 million people - were left homeless and forced to flee. Approximately 60 to 80 thousand people fled to Afghanistan, including the leaders and fighters of the defeated Opposition. The rest, if they did not move to more peaceful parts of Tajikistan, emigrated to other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Today, there may be approximately 325 thousand people displaced within and outside Tajikistan. The largest group of these people, numbering approximately 150 thousand, reside temporarily in Russia.

The economic cost of damage from the war is estimated at 7 billion US dollars, largely in infrastructure damage, according to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This cost comes, of course, on top of the already severe economic crisis Tajikistan experienced as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union.

4. APPLICATION OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

In late 1992, the UN Secretary General dispatched two missions to mediate the conflict and identify vulnerable groups for emergency humanitarian assistance. The first mission focused on re-establishing the legitimacy of the Tajik state through its official legal structures; the second mission negotiated conditions whereby regional states and the Russian Federation could take part in a comprehensive political solution.

The UN missions and the Dushanbe government quickly agreed, as part of an integrated approach to resolving the crisis and addressing humanitarian needs, that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would lead efforts to: (i) provide material humanitarian assistance to Tajik refugees in Afghanistan; (ii) contain further outmigration of internally displaced persons; and (iii) assist in repatriation and resettlement efforts. Operations began in 1993.

International response was slow initially. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) launched an inter-agency appeal, calling on the UNHCR, the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to help with refugee repatriation, food, shelter, sanitation and health needs. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) also issued appeals, along with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), and the Aga Khan Foundation. Combined appeals by 1994 raised 50 million dollars for the international humanitarian assistance effort, twenty percent of which was US-funded. International donors estimate that US leadership raised 4 US dollars for every 1 US dollar donated by the United States.

As the humanitarian assistance mission matured, Dushanbe's small diplomatic community, officials in Washington, international organizations (IOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) cooperated to forge links to monitor human rights and deliver more assistance at lower cost. This cooperation has helped to facilitate UN-brokered national reconciliation talks and to promote peace at the grass roots level. It has also resulted in an impressive partnership between international organizations and US-based PVOs.

A good example of IO-PVO partnership involves the provision of food and shelter as part of a food-for-work program in the southern region of Khatlon, where many of the 60 thousand refugees who fled to Afghanistan have been repatriated. UNHCR provides the building materials, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) supplies the food commodities, and Save the Children, with funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), coordinates and oversees the construction of homes. As of October 1995, Save the Children had aided in the reconstruction of 17 thousand homes, the cleaning of 1,700 kilometers of canals, and the clearing of 37 thousand cubic meters of rubble. This work has provided services for 102 thousand people in 171 participating villages. An additional 3,600 contracts have been signed for further reconstruction. A total of 1,042 work brigades, most often led by women, have been formed. These brigades have 12,980 members. Improved infrastructure and better food and economic security have allowed Save the Children to begin an economic opportunities program, which has helped over 200 women start new businesses.

The food-for-work program in Khatlon has clearly done more than just rebuild homes. Entire communities have come back together to rebuild their lives. People are literally working together again for a common goal, and a government that preferred obscurity is now open to broad cooperation with IOs and PVOs.

Another example of international cooperation is in the area of health. Relief International, a US-based PVO, has received funding and in-kind donations from UNHCR, USAID, and the Dutch government to provide essential medicines and

train medical personnel at local clinics in Khatlon and the Garm Valley. Relief International staff estimate that they have served over 500 thousand people through these clinics.

Relief International also recently initiated a small enterprise development program for women in Khatlon, with funding from UNHCR. Like the economic opportunities program developed by Save the Children, this program will give women the tools they need to survive in Tajikistan's new economy. These are the building blocks of peace which lay the foundation for long-term sustainable development.

5. OUTCOMES OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

I have discussed the broad features of our humanitarian intervention in Tajikistan - the history of UN involvement, the key role played by the United States, and the successful partnership between IOs and PVOs. Now, I would like to take a moment to examine some of the broader outcomes of this effort. Clearly, our humanitarian assistance has assisted thousands of people affected by the civil war, by rebuilding homes, repairing water lines, creating jobs, and improving living conditions. Of more importance in the longer term, humanitarian assistance has improved the climate for peace.

The sheer visibility of the intervening organizations, particularly UNHCR, and their vigilance, has led to a better human rights situation. Although human rights groups have catalogued continuing human rights abuses, the situation has improved. The Garm Valley, a hotbed of Opposition activity and an area which was, until just recently, off limits for security reasons to the assistance community, now hosts two US-based PVOs, Relief International and Mercy Corps. This is not to say that there are no more human rights problems in Garm - there are - but these two organizations are working hard to provide assistance and monitor conditions in the valley.

The principal reason for the successful outcome of the intervention in Tajikistan is leadership. In Dushanbe, there has been very strong and effective leadership among the field representatives of UNHCR, the UN Military Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT), and PVOs. Each week, these organizations, together with the diplomatic community, hold informational meetings on relief activities and security concerns. These meetings are known as the Dushanbe Forum. This forum is a model of cooperation which has enabled the international community to make the most effective use of its resources. In Washington, Refugees International and the Open Society Institute convene the Tajikistan Open Forum every two to three months to assemble local representatives from the IO, PVO and diplomatic community. The Tajikistan Open Forum, accessible to anyone interested in Tajikistan, has helped to forge better links between government and non-governmental representatives and to make better use of the IO-PVO partnership.

6. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

What has this intervention cost us? Precious little compared to the cost of the conflict itself and the potential costs to the region if the international community had done nothing. Since 1993, the US government has spent approximately 70 million US dollars in total assistance to Tajikistan. Our initial contributions leveraged significant support from other donors - 4 US dollars for every 1 US dollar given by the United States. The effort has created an effective partnership between IOs and PVOs that should be the envy of anyone working in a complex humanitarian crisis.

Before concluding, I would like to mention that USAID, through Basic Health Management, a recognized consulting firm, is presently undertaking an independent assessment of our PVO program in Tajikistan. The team left yesterday for Dushanbe and will spend approximately three weeks in the field, assessing the management of PVOs and the implementation of assistance. Upon its return, the team will also prepare a draft request for application (RFA) for Fiscal Year 1996 funding. We look forward to the conclusions of this assessment and expect that they will match many of our own.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Tajikistan is a place where preventive action has worked. In establishing a successful intervention framework in a country that only recently gained independence, we have helped to mitigate the most disastrous effects of the civil war and to prevent bad from going to worse. Current expectations for the fifth round of peace talks speak for the benefits of acting early and in a concerted fashion. If the Tajiks do make peace soon, in the next year or even in several, we will be looking at a country which the international community characterizes as "on the mend" - though very fragile indeed. In a world where most civil conflicts go from bad to worse, it is good to find one where assistance has worked.

DOSSIER ITEM NUMBER (2)

Summary, by IRSS, of the discussion that followed a presentation by Mark Nichols, US Agency for International Development December 1st, 1995

1. INTRODUCTION

This document summarizes the discussion that followed Mark Nichols' presentation. For the convenience of the reader, this summary is organized according to the same format as was used for the presentation. The actual discussion did not follow this sequence. This summary was prepared by the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS), which is solely responsible for its content. Factual statements are reported here, drawing from discussion at the seminar. IRSS has not independently verified these statements.

During the seminar, IRSS distributed a briefing sheet containing the following basic information, drawn in part from the CIA's 1994 World Factbook:

Tajikistan has an area of 143,000 square kilometers (slightly smaller than Wisconsin). It borders Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It had the lowest per capita GDP and the highest population growth rate of the USSR republics. The economy is largely based on cotton production, although only 6 percent of the land is arable. There is substantial hydropower potential. Tajikistan provides part of the drainage basin that feeds the Aral Sea. Poor irrigation practices have led to increasing levels of soil salinity in this basin and to shrinking of the Aral Sea. The population of Tajikistan is about 6 million (65 percent Tajik, 25 percent Uzbek, 3 percent Russian, 7 percent other). About 600,000 people were displaced by the 1992 civil war.

IRSS's briefing sheet also quoted the opening paragraph of an August 1995 report by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs:

"As the Republic of Tajikistan continues its difficult transition into a multi-ethnic society with a free market economy, the hurdles it must overcome remain significant. Low-level fighting continues with opposition forces along the border with Afghanistan and terrorist attacks against government officials, CIS soldiers and private individuals are on the rise. The economy staggers under the demands of economic reforms, and political settlement with the opposition still has not been reached."

2. THE CONFLICT SITUATION

There was discussion about the potential for resumed violence in Tajikistan. One participant questioned Mark Nichols' claim that the situation has stabilized. In response, it was argued that the chance of the war starting again is very small. There is a continuing insurgency by an opposition that is heavily supported by

Muslim fundamentalists in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The opposition is capable of mounting significant attacks on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and in parts of the interior. For example, in the Garm Valley there was recently a massive attack on the town of Garm, and one of the western PVOs almost lost one of its relief workers. The PVO had to pull out until the situation calmed, and then it moved back in. The continuing insurgency costs lives, damages infrastructure, and creates problems in the reconciliation process. Overall, however, the opposition is using violence primarily as a tool to show the international community that it is still a significant player.

3. OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT

There was discussion about the potential for violence to spread from Tajikistan to other countries in the region. Participants agreed that this potential is real, and provides a powerful motive to contain the conflict in Tajikistan. The population of Tajikistan is about 6 million, but a larger population lies to its north. In Uzbekistan, in an arc stretching from the Fergana Valley in the east through Tashkent (Uzbekistan's capital) to the west, about 20 million people live in close proximity to Tajikistan. This location is one of the most densely populated areas of the former Soviet Union, an area that is riven by land disputes, water disputes and ethnic conflicts.

Under some scenarios, an escalated conflict in Tajikistan could spread to Uzbekistan and, conceivably, to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well. Such a regional conflict could have serious consequences, and there is broad agreement that it must be prevented. Thus, containing the conflict in Tajikistan is an important goal from the perspective of US national security. For the US, the challenge is to find methods of containing the conflict that do not involve the application of undue force or the violation of human rights. It was pointed out that the government of Uzbekistan brutally suppressed its opposition when the Tajikistan civil war broke out, because it feared a spillover of violence from Tajikistan. Within Tajikistan itself, there is a serious record of human rights abuses.

4. APPLICATION OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

Participants drew attention to the importance of preventive actions in Tajikistan by members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), primarily Russia. These actions are of two major kinds: economic assistance; and the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Economic aid is important because the economy of Tajikistan suffers from three major burdens. First, Tajikistan's per capita GDP was the lowest of the USSR republics. Second, the breakup of the USSR and the simultaneous transition to a market economy have created serious economic difficulties in Tajikistan, as in other CIS countries. Third, the civil war and ongoing insurgency have further depressed the economy. Russian economic assistance has helped to keep

Tajikistan afloat through this difficult period and has therefore served a preventive function, helping to prevent the kind of chaos that has been experienced in Somalia and elsewhere.

A heavily armed peacekeeping force of about 20,000 troops has been deployed in Tajikistan for several years. The force is mostly Russian, and is under Russian command, but contains troops from other CIS countries. Its primary mission is to guard the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where Tajik opposition forces are based. The cost of this force is borne by the participating CIS countries, primarily Russia. When the force was deployed, Russia did not ask for either approval or support from the United Nations. Subsequently, Russia has sought to have this force designated as a UN peacekeeping force, with accompanying financial support from the UN peacekeeping fund. Neither UN designation nor UN funding have been granted, and this situation is unlikely to change.

The United Nations deploys the UN Military Observer Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT), which has about 15 personnel. This mission observes events in the country, including the activities of the CIS peacekeeping force, and also acts as a resource for international organizations and PVOs. For example, when opposition forces recently attacked the town of Garm, UNMOT helped PVO personnel and other members of the international community to leave the town.

There was discussion about which actions can appropriately be designated as "preventive". One participant argued that this designation should be reserved for interventions that occur in the period immediately prior to a potential outbreak of violence. With such a definition, the humanitarian activities described by Mark Nichols, while clearly valuable, cannot be regarded as preventive actions. Most participants took a different view. They noted that conflicts are often cyclical, so that actions taken after an episode of violence -- such as the humanitarian programs initiated after Tajikistan's civil war -- may be important in preventing another outbreak of violence. Moreover, it was generally agreed that the universe of preventive actions should properly include actions that are taken well before a potential outbreak of violence, as well as actions that meet human needs and promote a stable society. The humanitarian programs described by Mark Nichols meet both conditions.

Another subject of discussion was the need for many different kinds of preventive actions to be applied in a particular conflict situation. In Tajikistan, humanitarian assistance should be viewed in the context of other actions, such as peace negotiations, Track Two diplomacy, economic aid, promotion of democracy, development assistance, and peacekeeping. These various actions do not always fit together well. For example, peacekeeping and internal security in this region tend to be applied in a heavy-handed, even brutal, manner. As one illustration, Tajikistan is the world's number one abuser, on a per capita basis, of journalists. This kind of record is quite properly condemned by human rights organizations, and is not consistent with a society that is stable and peaceful in

the long term. Yet, participants pointed out how the prompt application of tight government controls can avoid violence in the short term.

Before 1995, the human rights situation in Tajikistan precluded the United States, and other governments and international organizations that are concerned about human rights, from becoming involved in any way other than humanitarian assistance. In the area of humanitarian assistance, however, the United States took the lead in supplying funding, thus catalyzing an international relief effort to which, by 1994, other governments provided about 4 US dollars for each 1 US dollar contributed by the United States. Because the United States took this funding initiative, beginning soon after the end of the civil war, much of the humanitarian assistance has been delivered by US-based NGOs and PVOs. During 1993 and 1994, most of the US contribution was in the form of food donations.

Participants discussed the problems of coordinating preventive actions and other interventions in Tajikistan. Coordination has been important because a variety of international agencies, NGOs and PVOs have been working in Tajikistan, pursuing a variety of agendas. As mentioned by Mark Nichols in his presentation, high levels of coordination and cooperation have been achieved. It seems, however, that much of this success has been due to the leadership abilities of some key individuals. Current institutional and bureaucratic arrangements cannot be relied upon to achieve the necessary coordination. Also, it is not clear that coordination of interventions in Tajikistan has extended to CIS economic aid and the CIS peacekeeping force.

Another subject of discussion was the obtaining of early warning and the incorporation of this warning into the US government's decision-making process. The United States maintains a vast intelligence apparatus, but it seems that this apparatus is not geared to provide the kind of early warning that is needed to support a preventive action approach. Similarly, the decision-making process is not optimal for a preventive approach. Decisions to intervene, as in Tajikistan, tend to be taken in an ad hoc manner, and are heavily reliant on the initiative of a few key individuals.

5. OUTCOMES OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

Participants asked about the ongoing evaluation, by the consulting firm Basic Health Management, of programs conducted in Tajikistan by US-based PVOs. In response, it was said that this evaluation will be published soon after its completion, which is scheduled for early 1996. Various parties, including the World Bank and the UNDP, have expressed interest in seeing this evaluation.

6. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

To initiate discussion about the benefits and costs of preventive actions, one participant pointed out that any decision by the United States to engage in a

particular preventive action will be influenced by a variety of factors. Important factors will include the nature of the US interests in the region in question, the costs and anticipated effectiveness of the preventive action, the nature and scale of the potential violence that is being prevented, and the benefits that will flow to the United States and others if the preventive action succeeds. In theory, such factors would be weighed systematically, and an objectively defensible decision would result. In practice, decision-making is imperfect, and decisions do not always reflect an objective balancing of the relevant factors.

In the case of Tajikistan, other participants said, the decision to provide humanitarian assistance was not universally accepted within the US government. Many officials saw Tajikistan as peripheral to US interests. Eventually, a few key individuals persuaded the government to respond to appeals from UN agencies and other organizations. This decision is now generally regarded within the government as a wise one, partly because the humanitarian assistance program was successful, and partly because US funds leveraged support from other donors.

In responding to appeals to assist Tajikistan, the United States was conscious of the regional security implications of conflict in Tajikistan. Another factor was the role of Tajikistan in the drug trade. At present, the largest flow of drugs into Europe comes through Afghanistan and Tajikistan, then through Russia and into Europe. Greater instability in the region would allow the drug trade to expand.

Participants discussed the potential economic opportunities that might be available in Tajikistan when its society and economy have stabilized. Access to these opportunities by US corporations could be regarded as a significant benefit of preventive actions. In this connection, it was pointed out that there are substantial reserves of minerals in Tajikistan, including reserves of gold. Also, one of the world's largest aluminum plants is located in Tajikistan.

Several participants expressed the view that a compelling case had been made for the cost-effectiveness of preventive actions in Tajikistan. Given this case, and similar evidence from other situations that shows preventive actions to be highly cost-effective, these participants expressed surprise that a preventive approach is at all controversial in the United States. They speculated about the entrenched political and bureaucratic interests that might resist such an approach. In the ensuing discussion it was pointed out that, in general, neither the American public nor US government officials have much familiarity with preventive actions. Also, there is a lack of the governmental procedures and institutional arrangements that are needed to effectively implement a preventive approach. These deficiencies, as much as entrenched interests, are impeding the implementation of preventive actions.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Mark Nichols' presentation, and the ensuing discussion, provided an excellent introduction to the role of humanitarian assistance as a preventive action in Tajikistan. Four major points of general agreement emerged from the discussion. First, humanitarian assistance has helped to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan, improving the prospects of a lasting peace. Second, this assistance has made a cost-effective contribution to US national security. Third, humanitarian assistance should be seen in the context of other preventive actions in Tajikistan, including the deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force. Fourth, the US government's decision to provide funds for humanitarian assistance in Tajikistan was taken in an ad hoc manner; this reflects a general lack of appropriate procedures and institutional arrangements for implementing a preventive approach.

Many other issues were also raised. This meeting brought together a group of well-informed people, and provided a fertile opportunity for a wide-ranging review of preventive actions in Tajikistan and elsewhere. Further discussions of this kind are needed, as part of a national debate on incorporating preventive principles into US national security policy.

DOSSIER ITEM NUMBER (3)

Participants in a Seminar on December 1st, 1995

This seminar was held at the offices of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, Washington, DC. The seminar featured a presentation by Mark Nichols, followed by discussion. The affiliations of participants are shown for identification purposes only.

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Institute for International Economics

Tom Greene
Refugee Policy Group

Heather Hamilton
World Federalist Association

Victoria Holt
Council for a Livable World Education Fund

Barrington King
Refugees International

Don Krumm
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